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PATENTED PERSONALITY
Christopher R. Muse*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article presents a current examination of the state and
structure of artificial intelligence (AI) and its patentability. Because
artificial intelligence is on the technological horizon, an understand-
ing of its internal and theoretical workings is requisite to any at-
tempt to procure patent protection of an artificial intelligence
inventor's rights.
This article addresses two issues. First, whether artificial intel-
ligence personality (AiP), the "module," as defined herein, could
ever properly be subject to protection under current patent laws.
Before this issue can be addressed, however, it will be necessary to
attempt to define the meaning of AIP, which requires significant
analysis of the concepts forming current Al theory. Second, if AIP
by itself is found to be outside the scope of patent protection, will it
be prudent to attempt to patent an AI system embodying AIP.
II. THE PERSONALITY CONCEPT
"Personality," in an AI application, is the quintessence or sine
qua non of an Al system in that it allows synergy, growth, or learn-
ing of new and appropriate behavior. AIP would be an internally
self-directed and task-oriented system to whatever extent Al's be-
havior could be self cognizable. In the built-in quest for increased
appropriateness, AIP would be designed to supervise a vast number
of programs, subprograms, system resources, and even itself.1
The responses produced by an AIP could be designed to repre-
sent any desired form of simulated thought,2 rational or irrational,3
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1. This, of course, insofar as all of the system's resources (beyond hardware devices)
could be made cognizable to AI, subject to the Incompleteness Theorem and other phenom-
ena of representation and interpretation, and limited by the problem of simultaneous creation
and integration of the same piece of newly generated information.
2. "Simulated thought" means mechanized reasoning, whether simple or complex.
3. See PARRY, a program created by Kenneth Colby which simulates the behavior of a
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so long as the output generated was appropriate.4 Responses could
then be fed back to the AIP to allow the AIP to evaluate its own
responses in terms of short term goals, or expectations (long range
ultimate goals serving as indicia of appropriateness).5 Hypotheti-
cally, the greater the number of non-trivial6 effective goals, the
greater the degree of "intelligence" and the need for AIP as a means
to deal with paradoxes, contradictions, and conflicts.
It should be noted that correct answers, the desired products of
most programs, are not the ultimate touchstones of intelligence.
Right answers and appropriate answers are not necessarily the
same.' Humans learn by making mistakes, remembering them, and
acting on them in future situations. Insight can be gained from a
wrong answer and may serve to redirect the search for a better an-
swer. Likewise, the wrong answer may redefine the question, or
show that a right answer is secondary to the most appropriate an-
swer obtainable under the circumstances.
paranoid personality. D.R. HOFSTADTLER, GODEL, ESCHER, AND BACK: AN ETERNAL
GOLDEN BRAID at 300-301, 599-600 (1980) [hereinafter HOFSTADTLER].
4. That is, appropriate to the task or function assigned to AI and to personality.
5. M. J. PEDELTY, AN APPROACH To MACHINE INTELLIGENCE, at 11 (1963) [here-
inafter PEDELTY].
6. Id.
7. Port, Computers that Come Awfully Close to Thinking, BUSINESS WEEK, June 2,
1986, 92, 94.
8. In 1956, four prominent researchers (Marvin Minsky of M.I.T., John Mc-
Carthy of Stanford, Nathaniel Rochester of IBM, and Claude Shannon of Bell
Labs) called a meeting at Dartmounth College to discuss ways of simulating
thought with computers. The meeting resulted in the formal establishment of
the term "artificial intelligence" and featured a theorem-proving program de-
veloped by Alan Newell and Herbert Simon, of Carnegie-Mellon, and J.C.
Shaw of Rand Corporation. Newell and Simon utilized the natural strength of
the computer in symbol-manipulation-searching, comparing and modifying
information-to model human thinking. The result was GPS, the "General
Problem Solver." GPS was based on the belief that a few laws of reasoning
("heuristics") combined with powerful computers could simulate human intel-
ligence. Although GPS could handle a restricted domain of puzzles with a
relatively small set of states and well-defined formal rules, researchers soon
realized that "brute force" (the classic example being a chess-playing program
that appears intelligent only because it can search many more potential moves
than a human) failed as a realistic model of human thought. Moreover, GPS
and other general-purpose problem solving strategies were too weak to handle
significant real-world problems.
Despite the limited ability of GPS, the emergent concept of heuristics, or
"rules of thumb" that humans or machines use "to recognize promising ap-
proaches to problems, to break problems down into smaller problems, to get
around incomplete date, and to make educated guesses where necessary," be-
came the focus of AI research.
S. NYCUM & I. FONG, MACHINE INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED PROBLEMS (1985) [herein-
after NYCUM].
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The challenge is to maximize the AIP's growth while minimiz-
ing system states which interfere with the selection of appropriate
behavior and disable the system.9 However, these problematic sys-
tem states may serve as lessons to enable the AIP to avoid or effec-
tively manage such situations in the future. AIP should be able to
effectively use knowledge gained from wrong or inappropriate an-
swers to foster positive growth, by recording problems and their
resolution for future use.
When two or more incomprehensible system states occur, caus-
ing a disabling confusion or misinterpretation, the AIP could be
designed to intercede and formulate an appropriate course of action.
The AIP could revise and adjust to resolve the conflict by assigning
a preference for one system state depending upon the purpose of the
AL. This would be accomplished by providing hierarchies and net-
works of heuristics to integrate the rules for problem-solving, and
hermeneutics which incorporate the rules for establishing
relevancy. 0
The AIP could be designed to lie dormant until summoned, yet
able to monitor and record significant aspects of the AIP's experi-
9. Means of control, integration and management of Al could be devised which were
deterministically automatic, or brute force impositions of structure on AI's behavior, but this
would tend to destroy synergistic possibilities for learning and creative growth which are
prerequisite to intelligence.
10. In order to accomplish the functions mentioned and also perform AI system organi-
zation, metacontrol, integration of hardware configuration options, management of AI's be-
havior and software, without exerting undue influence on creativity and positive synergistic
growth, AIP would be designed with at least some of the following features:
1. heuristics: the rules for problem solving, especially those that use self-
educating techniques such as the evaluation of feedback to improve the sys-
tem's ability to cope with ambiguity, brittleness, and blindness;
2. hermeneutics: the rules for making interpretations, such as determin-
ing relevancy or appropriateness. Such rules would be designed into Al and
AiP and could be supplemented with new hermeneutics generated by AI or
AiP, if appropriate, enabling AI to interpret its own experiences, understand
its own internal language, and resolve queries about its experience;
3. catalogs of britical, goal, and past problematic system states and their
resolutions, useful solutions structures, and any other helpful records of experi-
ence;
4. hierarchies of goals, objectives, and purposes, levels of control and
metacontrol, and networks of formal structures for generating increasingly ap-
propriate responses;
5. means for integrating Al behaviors and reactions within the system
and between the system and the environment without resorting to forced pre-
determination;
6. flexible procedures for handling disabling confusions, contradiction,
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ence through feedback techniques." The AlP could be designed to
be silent until invoked and potentially omnipotent when activated.
Alternatively, the AIP could be designed to be triggered by any pre-
determined or determinable system state in order to provide herme-
neutic aid in resolving problematic system states using design
redundancies."2 Although a number of different designs have been
postulated for the AIP, the final structure is ultimately a function of
its control ability. Predetermination and absolute certainty must
give way to flexible solution searching. Although some control is
needed to remedy and prevent disabling system problems, it should
not inhibit growth and development. This will be discussed at
greater length below.
In order to achieve flexibility, it is believed that an AIP must
be able to exert control over its own operating system, i.e., metacon-
trol.13 Without such control the system would simply stop or mal-
function when a disabling system state arose. The problem with
this design is that for each new control added, an additional control
may be required.14 For this reason, the system is never truly com-
plete, hence, the pitfall of the Incompleteness Theorem.
15
Every hierarchy must have a top, some level where the ulti-
and unforeseen contingencies, insofar as such contingencies could be planned
for;
7. means for managing the system without impairing opportunities for
positive creativity, synergy, learning, and growth;
8. means for recording, cataloging, and analyzing AI's experience with-
out interrupting AI in its performance of its assigned tasks; and
9. means for dealing with paradoxes likely to thwart AI, such as Tur-
ing's paradox and the Liar's paradox.
11. This could be accomplished through negative feedback or through positive or nega-
tive feedforward. See HOFSTADTLER, supra note 3, at 544-545.
12. "No semi-hard problem can be solved feasibly by computer program, unless the
program is enriched with a larger or smaller catalogue of logically redundant heuristic infor-
mation." D. MICHIE, MACHINE INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED Topics at 178 (1982). See
also J. ROTHFEDER, MINDS OVER MATTER, 39-59 (1985) [hereinafter ROTHFEDER]; Hop-
STADTLER, supra note 3, at 18, 97, 101.
13. Metacontrol would be control above a lower level control, and meta-metacontrol,
likewise, would be control over the control of the lower level control.
14. HOFSTADTLER, supra note 3, at 687 (discussion of how a self-modifying game
would have rules for the game, metarules to tell how to modify the game and the rules, meta-
metarules to tell how to modify the metarules and so forth ad nauseum).
15. The Incompleteness Theorum says for any formal system what the Liar's paradox
says for language in the following statement: "Everything I say is a lie." A formal system is a
system which is governed by rules.
There are many levels from which "completeness" can be analyzed. Ideally, personality
could provide completeness for Al's otherwise unexplained behaviors with respect to its own
internal language and its analysis therof and with respect to its ordinary work conjoined with
completeness of the other two levels mentioned.
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mate choices and the highest level goals are determined. 6 In our
model, the AIP represents the highest level in the AI system, the
internally omniscient and omnipotent reference point to which the
system could turn to when all else fails. AIP would provide layer
upon layer of control, metacontrol, meta-metacontrol, etc.. Each
new control adds a greater synergistic ability to create knowledge
and flexibility within the system.
III. INTELLIGENCE: HuMAN VS. ARTIFICIAL
One of the most perplexing problems facing AI research is the
definition of human intelligence. As long as human intelligence re-
mains partially undefinable, an artificial form of that intelligence
will be more difficult to develop. Very few aspects of human intelli-
gence, such as the neuron network structure of the brain, are com-
pletely understood. 7  Although human intelligence probably
involves more than the ability to comprehend natural language, this
is a major requirement of artificial intelligence.'" For a machine to
understand human language, the machine must first be able to un-
derstand its own internal language.' 9 The internal language of an
AI system, and in particular an AIP, would include some form of
16. J. ALBUS, BRAINS, BEHAVIOR, & ROBOTIcs, 208 (1981).
17. For instance, the inherent structural organization of the brain . both machines
and people are made of hardware which runs all by itself, according to the laws of physics."
HOFSTADTLER, supra note 3, at 685.
We feel self-programmed. Indeed we couldn't feel any other way, for we are
shielded from the lower levels, the neural tangle. Our thoughts seem to run
about in their own space creating new thoughts and modifying old ones, and
we never notice any neurons helping us out! But that is to be expected.
Id. at 692.
18. [A]Ithough developers have yet to claim that their computers actually un-
derstand ordinary English, their systems at least can appear to understand. A
well-known example of a computer appearing to understand ordinary English
is ELIZA, developed by Joseph Weizenbaum in 1966. ELIZA acts the part of
a psychiatrist and relies on a clever system of rather fixed patterns of responses
that give an imitation of language understanding many people find convincing.
If the patient types "I'm feeling a bit tired," ELIZA can embed part of the
patient's sentence in its reply: "Why are you feeling a bit tired?" Recent ad-
vances permit programs to make plausible inferences from pre-defined scripts,
so that programs can answer questions given a descriptive passage and summa-
rize news stories as they appear on the wire service.
NYCUM, supra note 8, at 372 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). See also
ROTHFEDER, supra note 12, at 22, and MICHIE, supra note 12, at 134. See HOFSTADTLER,
supra note 3, at 608 regarding whether Doctor Weizenbaum's successor to ELIZA has a
personality.
19. See WINOGRAD & FLORES, UNDERSTANDING COMPUTORS AND COGNITION
(1986), for a discussion of this position based on the assumption that AI will never be capable
of natural language, and therefore true AI will not exist.
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electrical signals generated by the computer. In order for the
machine to understand itself, a metalanguage,2 ° to analyze the
AIP's natural language, must also exist. Metalanguage could en-
able AI to "remember" and integrate experiences without destroy-
ing synergy and creativity.
The existence of electrical signals in the internal control struc-
ture of the AIP leads one to believe that AIP can be mastered
through software. However, AI is concerned primarily with non-
numeric processes that involve complexity, uncertainty, and ambi-
guity, for which no known algorithmic solutions exist.2 In terms of
creating artificial intelligence, a computer would only be useful in
conjunction with an intelligence, human or otherwise, capable of
using it. Intelligence either resides in the programmer-user-de-
signer, who imparts decision-making power to the computer, or in
the computer itself, in an embodiment allowing the computer to
choose an appropriate response without intervening human
control. 22
A software embodiment of AIP would likely be a complex dy-
namic system, similar, in a simplistic sense, to a brain.23  This is
likely because all complex dynamic systems appear to be able to
develop new rules for governing behavior in order to adapt to their
unique and changing environment.24 If an application-specific AIP
could vary AI and its rules as its environment changes, the result
would be a "style" of behavior or "personality" which characterizes
the AI system as a whole. Scientists have already simulated such
behavior in complex dynamic systems utilizing modeling programs
capable of adapting and changing themselves. Furthermore, sys-
tems that exhibit their own adaptability, creativity and synergy
25
20. In order to circumvent the liar's paradox, symbolic logic can be used to refer to our
natural language. Language used to refer to another language is called metalanguage. The
language analyzed is called the object language. Since symbolic logic allows language to
examine itself, we might expect that AIP could examine Al as object language using the same
approach.
21. In summary, AI is concerned ... primarily with non-numeric processes that
involve complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity and for which known al-
gorithmic solutions do not exist... Thus Al can be considered to be built upon
... Knowledge of the domain of interest... Methods for operating on the
knowledge... Control structures for choosing appropriate methods and modi-
fying the data base (system status) as required.
W. GEVARTER, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, EXPERT SYSTEMS, COMPUTER VISION AND
NATURAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING, 183 (1984) [hereinafter GEVARTER].
22. PEDELTY, supra note 5, at 11 (1963).
23. Reiter, Toy Universes, SCIENCE 86, 55 (June 1986).
24. Id. at 55-56.
26. Id. at 56.
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have been developed.
IV. SUPPORTING TECHNOLOGY
A. Expert Systems
Although quantum leaps have been achieved in the areas of
neural networks and complex dynamic system research, scientists
are seeking to enlarge the validity of AI expert systems.26 Expert
systems are the branch of Al that attempts to simulate the expertise
of specialists in highly technical disciplines.27 One type of expert
system, a rule-based system, is an expert system based on the hy-
pothesis that expert knowledge consists of a large number of in-
dependent, situation-specific rules where computers simulate expert
reasoning by chains of deduction.
A modem expert system with the ability to analyze mass spec-
trograms, called DENDRAL, was created by the Nobel prize-win-
ning chemist Joshua Lederberg and computer guru Edward
Feigenbaum, at Stanford University.2" Feigenbaum created a sister-
system to DENDRAL, called META-DENDRAL. DENDRAL
identifies a substance based upon its mass spectrogram, whereas
26. NYCUM, supra note 8, at 368.
27. Davis, Mechanical Minds - More Firms Try to Put Skills of Key Staffers In Com-
puter Programs, Wall St. J., June 10, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
28. Mass spectroscopy is an established technique for identifying organic mole-
cules by analyzing the spectrum produced when the molecule is exposed to
light. The success of DENDRAL represented a major achievement in the ap-
plication of heuristics to create systems that mimic expert problem-solving.
Using DENDRAL as a prototype, Edward Shortliffe, also at Stanford, devel-
oped an expert system to tackle the more complex field of medicine. The pro-
gram, called Mycin, incorporated the knowledge and experience of human
experts to diagnose bacterial infections of the blood and advise physicians on
antibiotic therapy. As with current expert systems, the key step was the trial-
and-error consultation between the expert and the program to develop the hun-
dreds of rules and exceptions that human experts learn from theory and prac-
tice - a process which has become known as "knowledge engineering."
Although Mycin was actually limited in its usefulness in clinical situa-
tions, its development produced new insights on the structure of human rea-
soning. Researchers found that by removing the medical information, or the
knowledge base, from Mycin, what was left was the generalized logic of the
system. This system, dubbed Emycin for Essential Mycin, could then be con-
nected to a database containing heuristics from other fields such as geology or
computer-chip design. In addition, researchers added a program to Mycin that
would explain the logical analysis leading to Mycin's conclusion. Physicians
would thus be much more comfortable in either accepting or rejecting the com-
puter's reasoning and the later advice and diagnosis. Matching human queries
to machine explanations is one feature that distinguishes expert systems from
specialist texts.
NYCUM, supra note 8, at 367 (footnotes omitted).
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META-DENDRAL generates its own rules to explain the fragmen-
tation of molecules and compounds.29
The only knowledge META-DENDRAL possesses at the out-
set is a group of instructions, called the general legal syntax, that
allows the system to generate rules to explain the mass spectro-
grams it receives.30 The general legal syntax is generated by using
symbolic logic, such as "A implies B," and certain chemical struc-
tural information. Based upon the general legal syntax and. the par-
ticular chemical's mass spectrogram, META-DENDRAL can
formulate a general rule of mass spectronomy. 31 Feigenbaum in-
cluded a feature that allows the system to discard rules automati-
cally generated by the system if they contradict the rules already
generated by the system.32  Although these expert systems were
designed for use in medicine and chemistry, the most effective ex-
pert systems have been used to evaluate trouble along telephone
lines, lay out preventive maintenance programs for large power sta-
tions, and configure computer systems. The practical application of
expert sytems has been limited to only a few situations.33
29. ROTHFEDER, supra note 12, at 109-113 (1985).
30. Id.
31. META-DENDRAL came up with 33 rules for 3 different classes of steroids
that explained how to decipher which steroids were present in which com-
pounds. They were so unique and sufficiently good that they were published in
the Journal of American Chemical Society not as freaks produced by some
computer, but as genuine new knowledge. The computer wasn't even men-
tioned in the article, except in a footnote.
ROTHFEDER, supra note 12, at 112 (quoting Edward Fiegenbaum).
32. We cut back on the number of rules [generated by the system] as far as
possible by forcing the computer to continually refer to the data, the chemical
structure information, that gave rise to these rules. Every time there is a
branch added to the if/then tree, it asks of that branch, "Is nature telling me
that?" Then it goes back and looks at the data, with the help of its internal
question and answer program. If nature is not telling it what the new if/then
rules are representing-perhaps some knowledge that the computer has picked
up generated a mutant, inaccurate rule-then the statements are thrown out.
This way we can rapidly prune down a potential rule set that could conceivable
run into the millions, to one much smaller that the data is definitely pointing to
as necessary.
ROTHFEDER, supra note 12, at 111 (quoting Fiegenbaum).
33. [C]urrent expert systems are useful only for highly specialized tasks that
place a high value on knowledge of a single, well-defined subject. Moreover,
despite the increasing investment in research on expert systems by dozens of
companies, "expert systems software development costs are high, development
times are unusually long, and the resulting programs put a heavy burden on
computing resources."
Martins, The Overselling of Expert Systems, DATAMATION, Nov. 1, 1984, at 76.
Until current research in common sense and machine learning progresses to
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B. Symbolic Logic Language
Computer languages are being developed with greater potential
for symbolic logic than traditional "high level" languages, FOR-
TRAN, COBOL and BASIC. LISP, for LISt Processor, manipu-
lates symbols, words, phrases, and even geometrical figures, rather
than only numbers.34 LISP allows elaborate data structures and
makes complex data base management systems relatively easy to
build. Powerful symbolic logic languages, such as LISP, could be
used to develop the AIP because of the relative ease with which
non-numeric symbols and concepts can be manipulated in a quanti-
fied logic environment."5
C. New Design Frontiers
Advances in the development of AIP will ultimately depend
upon the development of hardware technology and not simply ad-
vances in AI programming. Two important areas of Al research
are: (1) neural network chips for use in neural network computers;
and (2) parallel design computers. Other promising areas include
high voltage electronic circuitry,36 submicron integrated circuits,37
the point of developing a "general" expert system, current expert systems re-
main sophisticated tools in specialized fields.
NYCUM, supra note 8, at 369, 370.
34. Alexander, The Next Computer Programming Revolution, FORTuNE, Oct. 29, 1984,
at 81.
35. [Computational logic, which earlier appeared doomed by combinatorial ex-
plosion] excessive proliferation of decision branches generated by the pure res-
olution approach, has become revitalized with new representation approaches,
inference rules, domain heuristics and advanced computers and will play an
increasingly important role in future Al applications.
GEVARTER, supra note 21, at 225.
The resolution approach in theorem proving proceeds either by manipulation
of the premises of an argument into equivalence with the conclusion by trans-
formation using rules of inference, or by reductio ad absurdum proof. Compu-
tational or Quantificational logic (a product of basic symbolic logic), allows for
categorical statements to be quantified, i.e. "For every X ... such that..."
"There exist a Y such that. . ." whereas basic sumbolic logic only allows for
negation, conjunction, disjunction, implication (if X then Y) and material (X if
and only if Y) equivalence. Formal logic systems permit analysis of categorical
statements representing a certain pattern of logical form, but devoid of subjec-
tive instantation. Form can represent any individual validly included in the
universe of discourse, by instantation of the empty form. Formal logic is a
valuable tool in AI and promises to become more so as fuzzy, multivalued and
non-monotonic logics come into their own.
See I. COPI, SYMBOLic LoGic, 166-170 (1973).
36. Bylinsky, Smart Power Chips.Are The Latest Turn-On, FoRTUNE, March 4, 1985, at
94.
37. By decreasing the width of the integrated circuit's channels from the average of 3
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superconducting integrated circuits, and "fuzzy logic."3
1. Neural Network Chips and Other Chip Designs
As noted earler, neural network computers operate signifi-
cantly different than conventional computers. By using the analog
neural networks designed to simulate neurons of a slug, researchers
at Bell Labs and in Japan39 have produced neural network chips.4"
Neural network computers using these chips contain the equivalent
microns today to below one micron, Perkin-Elmer has produced a machine for etching chips
which claims a '/4 micron circuit width potential. Smith, Electron-Beam Chipmakers Move
Out of the Lab, Bus. WK., Sept. 29, 1986, at 105. The speed of the chip is increased as is the
density which designers can utilize, and the Perkin-Elmer machine can be used to "print"
different chips on the same silicon semiconductor wafer. Id. By reducing the circuit width to
0.5 microns, and increasing chip size, TRW has designed chips which have 35 million compo-
nents. TRW and Motorola are working on Very High Speed Integrated Circuits (VHSIC), for
DoD, to create new chips 10,000 times more powerful than current IC's and TRW plans
production by 1989. Newport, A Supercomputer on a Single Chip, FORTUNE, Sept. 29, 1986,
at 128-129. See also Port, The Submicron Era May Belong to the Japanese, Bus. WK., March
16, 1987, at 98.' With submicron or Very High Speed Integrated Circuits (VHSIC),
chipmakers have bounded forward toward quantum increases in computing power which will
make AI easier to design and implement because of increased speed and design density
potential.
38. Port, Bell Labs Puts a Big Brain on a Small Chip, Bus. WK., Jan. 13, 1986, at 125.
39. See note 59 and text accompanying. See also Yoder, Worms and Slugs are Research
Tools in Japan's Search for New Computer, WALL ST. J., June 28, 1986.
40. [A] team of Bell (Laboratories) secientists has been using research on slugs'
brains to develop a radically new type of computer. It would use decision-
making techniques eerily similar to human intuition to solve certain compli-
cated problems almost instantly... [T]he conceptual focus of the Bell project
is the model of a neural-network computer created by [John] Hopfield...
Neural networks operate in the analog mode-when information enters the
brain, the neurons start firing and their values, or charges, rise and fall like
electric voltage in analog computers. When information is digested, the net-
work settles down into a so-called steady state, with each of its many neurons
resting close to their highest or lowest values-effectively, then, either on or
off. A computer designed to mimic a neural network would solve problems
speedily by manipulating data in an analog fashion. But it would report its
findings when each neuron is either in the on or off state, operating like a
digital computer speaking a binary language.
The simulated computer designed by Hopfield and his AT&T colleagues
uses microprocessors to do the work of neurons. Each microprocessor is con-
nected to all others-as many neurons are interconnected-which would make
the machines costly and complex to build. Another major difference between
this computer and traditional ones is that memory is not localized in any one
processor or set of processors. Instead memory is the pattern formed by all
neurons, whether on or off when they are in steady states. As a result, the
computer can deal with fragmentary or imprecise information .... Neural
network computers work best on problems that have more than one reasonable
solution.
Newport, What Bell Laboratories is Learning From Slugs, FORTUNE, April 1, 1985. See
Bylinsky, The High Tech Race: Who's Ahead, FORTUNE, Oct. 13, 1986, 26, 43.
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of more than 500,000 processors and 250,000 interconnections.4 1 A
group of researchers at TRW have designed a neural network com-
puter with 100 million processing elements. A major difference be-
tween this computer and a traditional one is that memory is not
localized in any one processor or set of processors. Instead memory
is the pattern formed by all neurons, whether on or off when they
are in steady states. As a result, the computer can deal with frag-
mentary or imprecise information. The ability to understand frag-
mentary or imprecise information would be a necessary feature for
promoting "intelligence" in an Al system.
The "transputer" created by INMOS, is another chip design
with AI and AiP ramifications. This chip contains microprocessor,
memory and communications circuitry in a single transputer,42 that
is ideal for neural network and parallel computer applications.4" In
fact, it has its own operating language, OCCAM, designed to avoid
the incongruity between parallel hardware and conventional
software.
2. Parallel Computers
Conventional computers solve problems sequentially, one step
at a time, while parallel systems divide the workload among multi-
ple processors that solve a problem simultaneously.' One parallel
computer, the Connection Machine, has 65,000 microprocessors,
processes seven billion instructions per second, and is 175 times
faster than a typical mainframe computer.45
One main problem with parallel computers is that all problems
may not easily be solved by parallel methods. For example, painting
a picket fence using one painter for each picket may be efficient, but
65,000 writers simultaneously working on the same article would be
grossly inefficient.46
In extremely large parallel computers, the effective - active
connections47 have meaning to the system. Such connections could
41. Port, supra note 38, at 96.
42. Petre, A Computer Chip with a Mind of Its Own, FORTUNE, 114 (May 14, 1984).
43. Id.
44. Davis, Superfast Computers Mimic the Structure of the Human Brain, WALL ST. J.
(Feb. 19, 1986).
45. Thinking Machine Unveils a Computer With New Technique, WALL ST. J. (May 1,
1986). See also FORTUNE, Oct. 13, 1986, at 36.
46. Id. at 1, 22. This is one main problem with parallelism: That all problems are not at
the current time solvable in parallel terms or at least are not at the present time easily defina-
ble in parallel-stage terms.
47. Port, Computers that Come Awfully Close to Thinking, Bus. WK., June 2, 1986, at
92, 93.
1988]
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be a strong candidate for the AIP approach to flexible meta-
control.48
V. PATENTS AND LAW
A. Patented Al Related Inventions
The AIP described above is a utopian system having all of the
features theorized as being necessary to create a truly intelligent
system comparable to the human brain. Although a considerable
amount of technology has been developed in an effort to create the
AIP, and a number of AI related inventions have been patented,
none of these developments completely embody the AIP described
above.49 Many of the patented, so-called "artificially intelligent,"
48. The personality concept could become as generic to AI as the operating system has
become to conventional computers, but since each Al system would require an individual-
ized, application-specific personality, each AIP would require a different patent. Each pat-
ented AIP would protect only its particular AI system, not seek to preempt the concept of
AIP itself. The fact that it is highly improbable that any two Al systems would accidentally
employ the same hardware, software, purposes, design, and systems of heuristics and herme-
neutics culminating in the same idiosyncratic intellectual properties, makes it highly unlikely
that two or more AIPs would be unintentionally the same.
If AIP could maintain its integrity and remain relatively unchanged as other parts of AI
evolve, then AIP could avoid a common pitfall of much of the software that seeks patent
protection: obsolescense before the patent is approved or denied. "Accordingly, patent pro-
tection should be given serious consideration with respect to the basic new features [of pro-
grams which embody creative concepts which are expected to be long-lived]." Port, at 94.
49. U.S. Pat. No. 3,950,733 is an information processing system which illustrates an
adaptive information processing system in which the learning growth rate is exponential
rather than linear. U.S. Pat. No. 3,715,730 is a mult-criteria search procedure for trainable
processors that illustrates a system having an expanded search capability in which trained
responses to input signals are produced in accordance with predetermined criteria. U.S. Pat.
No. 3,702,986 is a trainable entropy system that illustrates a series of trainable non-linear
processors in cascade. U.S. Pat. No. 3,700,866 is a synthesized cascaded processor system
that illustrates a system in which a series of trainable processors generate a probabilistic
signal for the next processor in the cascade, wherein the probabilistic signal is a best estimate
of a desired response for the next processor. U.S. Pat. No. 3,701,974 is for a learning circuit,
or a type of learning element, used in some prior art systems. U.S. Pat. No. 3,613,084 is for a
trainable digital apparatus which illustrates a deterministic synthesized boolean function.
U.S. Pat. No. 3,623,015 is for a statistical pattern recognition system with continual update of
acceptance zone limits that illustrates a pattern recognition system capable of detecting simi-
larities between patterns on a statistical basis. U.S. Pat. Nos. 3,999,161 and 4,066,999 relate
to statistical character recognition systems having learning capabilities.
Other patents that deal with learning systems that appear to be adaptive based upon
probability or statistical experience include U.S. Pat. Nos. 4,704,695; 3,725,875; 3,576,976;
3,678,461; 3,440,617; and 3,414,885. Patents showing logic circuits that may be used in some
of the above systems include U.S. Pat. Nos. 3,566,359; 3,562,502; 3,446,950; 3,103,648;
3,646,329; 3,753,243; 3,772,658; and 3,934,231.
Adaptive pattern, speech or character recognition systems are shown in the following:
U.S. Pat. Nos. 4,318,083; 4,189,779; 3,581,281; 3,588,823; 3,196,399; 4,100,370; and
3,457,552. U.S. Pat. No. 3,988,715 describes a system that develops conditional probabilities
character by character with the highest probability being selected as the most probable inter-
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systems are really adaptive pattern, speech or character recognition
systems that use probabilities or statistical information to form edu-
cated guesses as responses5 0
Many newer systems are a combination of new developments
and individual features disclosed in older systems, such as a proba-
bilistic learning system which is capable of modifying its databases
in response to feedback from the environment in which it operates
in order to produce more appropriate behavior.5 1 Expert systems
have also received a considerable amourft of patent attention. One
patent covers a computer system that evaluates the problem solving
ability of a target computer and then determines whether it would
be practical to write a computer program for the target computer to
solve a particular problem. 2 One system is even titled an "Artifi-
cial Intelligence System," and is described as performing processing
analogous to the continuous train of thought produced by human
beings in solving diverse problems. 3 However, this system is really
an interactive language processor and expert system which contains
a large database about a specific topic and which is capable of
resolving information gaps, contradictions and ambiguities by ques-
tioning the user and suggesting more appropriate inputs.54
The language that is used in describing some of these systems
could easily lead one to believe that they-are indeed the utopian AIP
described above. One such system is titled a "Knowledge Engineer-
ing Tool," and includes the following independent patent claim:
1. A knowledge engineering tool comprising a computer
having memory for storing a knowledge base... wherein said
knowledge base includes facts expressed as expressions
equivalenced to corresponding values, rules including premises
having logical operations and corresponding conclusions con-
cluding at least one value for a selected expression, prescribing
pretation of an optically scanned word. U.S. Pat. No. 3,267,431 describes a system that uses
a "perception," a weighted correlation network, that is trained on sample patterns for identi-
fication of other patterns.
50. See supra note 49.
51. Denenberg, U.S. Pat. No. 4,599,693, issued July 8, 1986 for a "Probabilistic Learn-
ing System," assigned to ITT Corporation, discloses such a system which also uses parallel
processing for enhanced speed, and overlapping and redundancy of tasks to enhance reliabil-
ity. Slack et al., U.S. Pat. No. 4,593,367, issued June 3, 1986, discloses a type of probabilistic
learning element which may be used in the above system.
52. ScQtt et al., U.S. Pat. No. 4,713,775, issued December 15, 1987, assigned to
Teknowledge, Incorporated of Palo Alto, California and Compagnie Generale de
Geophysique.
53. Scramm, U.S. Pat. No. 4,670,848, issued June 2, 1987, assigned to Standard Sys-
tems Corporation of Tampa, Florida.
54. Id."
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the manner in which facts and rules should be used, and declara-
tions defining whether certain of said expressions are singled-val-
ued or multiple-valued, and wherein said means for interpreting
said knowledge base includes means for determining the value of
any selected goal expression, means for searching the knowledge
base for occurrences of the selected expression, means for invok-
ing and chaining said rules concluding a value for the selected
goal expression, means for evaluation said logical operations in
the premises of the invoked rules, means for termination the
searching of the knowledge base for a single-valued expression
when a substantially certain value is found, and a for a multiple-
valued expression when all values for the expression are deter-
mined, and means for conveying to the user said value of said
goal expression. 5
The above language reads on much of the AIP described above and
would appear to claim an autonomous artificial intelligence system.
However, the specification for the above patent and a commonly
assigned related patent reveal that the described system is an expert
system, and that the meta-control necessary to modify the knowl-
edge base is supplied by an engineer interfaced with the system.56
B. Patentability of Future Al Systems and the AIP
In order to determine whether the AIP would be patentable,
like the other patented forms of artificial intelligence, it is necessary
to determine how these other inventions obtained patent protection.
An invention can qualify for patent protection if it satisfies the re-
quirements of 35 U.S.C. § 101, which provides, in part, that
"[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor."57 Many
of the above patents covering artificial intelligence related inven-
tions are for machines, systems, or process steps and therefore come
under the definition of § 101. Although some of the above inven-
55. Erman et al., U.S. Pat. No. 4,658,370, issued April 14, 1987, assigned to Teknowl-
edge, Inc., Palo Alto, California.
56. Id.; See also Hardy et al., U.S. Pat. No. 4,648,044, issued March 3, 1987, for a
"Basic Expert Sytem Tool," which has a similar independent claim that also includes the
following language:
1. A knowledge engineering tool comprising a computer ... said knowledge
base also including control knowledge supplied by a knowledge engineer to
modify the built-in control procedure, and a language interpreter for executing
the control knowledge to modify the built-in control procedure, whereby the
control knowledge can be separated from the factual knowledge and the judg-
mental knowledge and stored as a distinct portion of the knowledge base.
57. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
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tions are related to software developments, they can still come
under the definition of § 101, despite the generally wideheld belief
that patent protection is not available for software.58 Even an in-
vention which is described as a higher-level flexible knowledge lan-
guage (software), but is titled a "Method and Apparatus for
Building Knowledge-Based Systems," has been given patent protec-
tion. 9 The reason that these inventions have been granted patent
protection, even though software related, is that as long as an inven-
tion is claimed in relation to physical elements or process steps in an
otherwise statutory process, machine, manufacture, or composition
of matter, the invention can be patentable.'
Misunderstanding as to the patentability of software stems
from the Supreme Court's holding in Gottschalk v. Benson, which
stated that any type of patent which "would wholly preempt the
mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a patent on
the algorithm itself" could not be patented under § 101.61 This de-
cision was based on the understanding that laws of nature, physical
phenomena, and abstract ideas are excluded from patent protec-
tion. 2 As a result of the Supreme Court's holding in Benson, and a
number of other decisions,63 any invention embodying an algorithm
or law of nature was thought to be automatically excluded from
patent protection." However, the Supreme Court has subsequently
held that a claim is not unpatentable under § 101 merely because it
includes a step or element directed to a law of nature, mathematical
algorithm, formula or computer program, so long as the claim as a
whole is drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory. 5
Accordingly, subsequent cases before the Court of Custom and
Patent Appeals (now known as the Court of Appeals, Federal Cir-
cuit), have established that as long as the Freeman-Walter test is
satisfied, a claim embodying an algorithm can be subject to patent
58. Maier, Software Protection - Integrating Patent, Copyright and Trade Secret Law,
JPTOS 152 (March 1987).
59. Clemenson, U.S. Pat. No. 4,675,829, issued June 23, 1987, assigned to Intellicorp
Corp., Mountain View, California.
60. In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 214 U.S.P.Q. 682 (C.C.P.A. 1982). See also, Ex parte
John, 220 U.S.P.Q. 576 (P.T.O. Bd. App. 1983) ("Since the mathematical computation ap-
pears in apparatus and a process which are otherwise statutory subject matter, the instant
claims are proper.")
61. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 175 U.S.P.Q. 673 (1972).
62. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 209 U.S.P.Q. 1 (1981).
63. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 198 U.S.P.Q. 193 (1978).
64. Maier, supra note 58, at 152.
65. Id.
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protection.66 The Freeman-Walter test, a two-part test for analyz-
ing mathematical algorithm-statutory subject matter cases, is de-
rived from In re Freeman 67 as modified by In re Walter68, and is as
follows:
First, the claim is analyzed to determine whether a mathematical
algorithm is directly or indirectly recited. Next, if a mathemati-
cal algorithm is found, the claim as a whole is further analyzed to
determine whether the algorithm is "applied in any manner to
physical elements or process steps," and if it is, it "passes muster
under § 101.,,69
If this test was to be applied to an AI system utilizing the AP
as a central core, having all of the desired abilities postulated above,
it would resolve that the AIP is statutory subject matter under
§ 101. Although there may be serious questions regarding the stat-
utory nature of the AIP itself, the AIP's embodiment in a computer
system would absolve any § 101 problems. As was stated in In re
Abele,7 ° "if the claim would be 'otherwise statutory,' id.[sic], albeit
inoperative or less useful without the algorithm, the claim likewise
presents statutory subject matter when the algorithm is included."71
Patenting the AIP as a central core of an entire AI system
would provide little protection for the AIP. If a type of car is devel-
oped and patented as a system, and the engine is not itself patented,
the engine may be freely used for any purpose which does not in-
fringe the system patent. Likewise, if the AI system is patented, but
not the AIP itself, the AIP could be freely used for a wide variety of
other applications. A true AIP would have a myriad of applications
because of its flexibility and intelligence and would not be limited to
use in the AI system, just an an engine is not limited to use in a car.
If other components of the AI system were capable of growing
around the AIP, like software and peripheral devices grow around
an operating systems, these would be further incentive for attempt-
ing to protect the AIP. By protecting the AIP, exterior variable
portions of the system could continue to change and evolve, while
the AIP remained relatively fixed, thereby retaining value in the
original patent.72 An AIP core design would allow the AI system
66. In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 214 U.S.P.Q. 682 (C.C.P.A. 1982); and In re Pardo, 684
F.2d 912, 214 U.S.P.Q. 673 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
67. In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 197 U.S.P.Q. 464 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
68. In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 205 U.S.P.Q. 397 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
69. In re Pardo, 684 F.2d at 915, 214 U.S.P.Q. at 678 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
70. See note 68 and text accompanying.
71. 684 F.2d at 907.
72. Relatively few programs are appropriate subject matter for patent protection. Be-
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to be modified without changing other parts of the system, thereby
maintaining the fundamental integrity of the AI system and keeping
cause patent proceedings are expensive and time consuming, the program should be commer-
cially important and should embody creative concepts which are expected to be long lived.
Of course with respect to [short lived] programs, fundamentally new features which will sur-
vive for many years may be suitable candidates for protection. In this regard, broad patent
protection, such as in the "means plus function" format, may continue to cover fundamen-
tally new features even though subsequent enhancements of the program have caused the
implementation of the feature to evolve into a specifically different form. Accordingly, patent
protection should be given serious consideration with respect to basic new features of such
programs.
In addition to the requirements of commercial importance and long life, a suitable candidate
for patent protection should incorporate fundamentally new programming features or advan-
tages. Programs which demonstrate little creativity will probably not be sufficiently inventive
to meet patentability requirements.
See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Matter of Application of Bradley, 600 F.2d 807
(C.C.P.A. 1979), aff'd, 450 U.S. 381 (1981); Paine, Webber v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 564 F.
Supp 1358 (D. Del. 1983). The primary claim in Matter of Application of Bradley is illustra-
tive of the broad terms in which patent claims are typically formed:
1. In a multiprogramming computer system having a main memory, a central
processing unit (CPU) coupled to said main memory, said CPU controlling the
state of a plurality of groups of processes being in a running, ready, wait or
suspended state, said computer system also having scratchpad registers being
accessible to an operating system for controlling said multiprogramming com-
puter system, a data structure for storing coded signals for communicating be-
tween said processes and said operating system, and said scratchpad registers,
said data structure comprising:
(a) first means in said data structure and communicating with said operating
system for storing coded signals indicative of an address for a selected one of
said processes;
(b) second means in said first means for storing coded signals indicating prior-
ity of said selected one of said processes in relation to others of said processes
for obtaining control of said CPU when ready;
(c) third means in said data structure and communicating with said operating
system, for storing coded signals indicative of an address for a selected one of
said plurality of groups of processes; and
(d) fourth means coupled to said data structure and said scratchpad registers,
for generating signals causing the changing of information in said data struc-
ture and said scratchpad registers.
Matter of Application of Bradley, 600 F.2d at 809.
This claim is in "means plus function" format, a broad form of expression used to set forth
the boundaries of the protection afforded by the patent. The "means plus function" format,
for example, "second means. . .," is explicitly sanctioned by statute and is deemed to cover
"the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents
thereof." See 35 U.S.C. Section 112 (1982).
In summary, the significant advantages provided by patents, with respect to
both the breadth and reach of the protection, are tempting. Few programs,
however, will possess the commercial importance, expected lifetime, and nov-
elty required to be suitable for patent protection. With respect to the few that
do, patent protection should be given serious consideration in view of its supe-
rior breadth and reach."
Anthony & Colwell, Litigating the Validity And Infringement of Software Patents, 41 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 1307, 1311.
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the AIP from becoming obsolete before the patent application is
approved or denied.73
The purpose of the AIP is to help and guide the AI system in
its own search for appropriateness, and to protect, in patent, the
essence of the system's intelligence and potential for growth. No
algorithm,74 in and of itself, could totally accomplish the purpose of
the AIP because any algorithm would merely be an aide to the
AIP's true .function.7" Any algorithm embedded in the AIP core
would be secondary to the network of goals, hermeneutics, heuris-
tics, learning and synergistic growth which would be the real inven-
tion comprised by the AIP and intended to be the system's mind.
In addition, the AIP could not be said to preempt an algorithm
because any calculated result of an algorithm embodied in the AIP
would be fed back into the AIP (or the AI system) to form only a
portion of the ultimate output of the system.
Even if the AiP was found not to preempt an algorithm, the
AIP may still run into problems under 35 U.S.C. § 101. In In re
Chatfield,76 it was stated that there are "two categories judicially
determined to be non-statutory, i.e., claims drawn to mathematical
problem solving algorithms or to purely mental steps."7 7 If the AP
was capable of intelligent thought and true flexibility, it might well
be considered as equivalent to a human brain. If the Patent Office
or a court were willing to analogize the AIP to the human mind, the
AIP may be considered to preempt purely mental steps and there-
fore be non-statutory.
The kind of problems that might be experienced by an appli-
cant for an AiP are shown in In re Meyer, which involved an appli-
cation for a process and an apparatus for carrying out the process of
testing a complex system and analyzing the results of the tests.78
The patent examiner rejected all claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
drawn to non-statutory subject matter.79 The specification and the
appellant's own oral arguments indicated that the invention was
concerned with replacing, in part, the thinking processes of a neu-
73. Davis, Computer Firms Turn to Patents, Once Viewed as Weak Protection, Wall St.
J., Jan. 28, 1986 at 33, col. 3.
74. In Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 198 U.S.P.Q. 193 (1978), the Supreme Court
reiterated the definition of an algorithm set forth in Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 175
U.S.P.Q. 673 (1972), as "a procedure for solving a given type of mathematical problem."
75. This is due partially because of the Incompleteness Problem, and partly because of
the nature and magnitude of the task required of personality.
76. In re Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152, 191 U.S.P.Q. 730 (C.C.P.A. 1976).
77. Id. at 157.
78. In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 215 U.S.P.Q. 193 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
79. Id. at 793.
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rologist with a computer."0 In fact, counsel for appellants went as
far as to acknowledge "in oral argument that the claims recite a
mathematical algorithm, which represents a mental process that a
neurologist should follow."81 By applying the Freeman-Walter test
to the claims, the court concluded that the claims were to an al-
gorithm representing a mental process that had not been applied to
physical elements or process steps and were therefore non-
statutory.82
Although the outcome of In re Meyer was in part due to appel-
lant's admissions that the mental processes replaced by the inven-
tion was an algorithm, the outcome should not have been a surprise.
In In re Castelet, the same court stated that abstract concepts were
not patentable and that in order for a claim to be statutory, it must
define more then mere effect.83 Likewise, in In re Sarker it was held
that
steps occurring only'in the mind have not been made subject to
patenting because mental processes are but disembodied
thoughts, whereas inventions which Congress is constitutionally
empowered to make patentable are tangible embodiments of
ideas in the useful, or technological arts.84
Chief Justice Markey's holding in In re Sarker would appear to pre-
clude patent protection for the AIP. However, Markey doubtfully
had an AIP in mind at the time of the above holding, and would not
be likely to apply the same restrictive test to such an important
technological breakthrough.
An alternative argument that could be made in favor of the
statutory nature of the AIP would relate to its metacontrol ability.
As described above, the AIP provides an ultimate control function
to the entire AI system; in essence, a computer which effects the
operation of another computer.8 5 A claim which relates only to the
control of the internal operations of a computer that governs the
manner in which programs are executed has been found not to em-
brace an algorithm.8 6 Similarly, inventions for improving the inter-
nal operations of computers have been found statutory,
notwithstanding the fact that they contained algorithms, because
80. Id. at 795.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 796.
83. In re Castelet, 562 F.2d 1236, 195 U.S.P.Q. 436 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
84. In re Sarker, 588 F.2d 1330, 1333, 200 U.S.P.Q. 132 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
85. Paine, Webber v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 564 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Del. 1983).
86. In re Abele, supra note 68.
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the algorithms were applied to the computer in a different way.8 7
Hence, an AIP's metacontrol ability may be considered sufficient to
constitute an application to physical elements or process steps in
accordance with requirements of § 101.
The vast number of communication channels likely to be uti-
lized within an AI system makes such a system a prime target for
severe noise related problems.88 "Noise" is a term that is utilized to
refer to persistent interference with electrical signals, but is more
commonly recognized as the hissing noise heard over radio chan-
nels or uncorrectable variations in signals observed by an oscillo-
scope. An Al system plagued with noise problems would require an
AIP that could filter-out and deal with noise within the AI system,
such as illigitimate rules generated by mutant reasoning. Thus if
noise removal or fitering was an important function of AIP, it
could be argued that with respect to its filtering ability, AIP was
statutory subject matter under § 101.
The bases for the above argument relates to two cases dealing
with software that removed noise from seismic trace prospecting
signals and thereby achieved better prospecting data. 9 The general
rule presented in those case was that if the invention in question
served to transform an input (a noisy signal) into a physically differ-
ent output (a less noisy signal), then the invention was patentable
within the meaning of § 101. Thus, if the AIP operated to trans-
form inputs into physically different outputs, (new system states
without noise), then the means by which such a new system state
was generated could arguably be patentable. The argument could
be made that the output is a system state just as the input was a
system state and is therefore not really a physically different output;
but the output of a seismic filtering program is a seismic trace just
as the input was a seismic trace (albeit without the noise).
VI. CONCLUSION
Although this article has analyzed the patentability of an AIP
in general terms, a general analysis is considered appropriate be-
cause (1) a wide variety of AI design philosophies and purposes are
abundant, and (2) AI behavior, as opposed to conventional comput-
87. In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912, 214 U.S.P.Q. 673 (C.C.P.A. 1982); and In re Chatfield,
545 F.2d 152, 191 U.S.P.Q. 730 (C.C.P.A. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
88. PEDELTY, supra note 5, at 14-30.
89. In re Johnson, 589 F.2d 1070 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Sherwood, 613 F.2d 809
(C.C.P.A. 1980); In re Tanner 681 F.2d 787 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
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ing, is more likely to occur in a flexible, relatively unorganized
environment.
Many more arguments can be made as to why AIP is not an
algorithm and should be within the statutory protection of § 101.
However, many of these arguments lead to a conclusion that AIP is
probably better defined as a preemption of mental steps, thereby
taking it out of statutory protection under § 101. Despite efforts to
remove AIP from applications relating to physical elements in the
first part of this analysis, it is the AIP's ability to control other
physical elements (metacontrol) which will probably provide AIP
with statutory protection. It should also be noted that for those not
familiar with patent law, the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 101 are
not the only prerequisites to patentability. 90
In short, this article has attempted to devise a method for pro-
tecting a non-existent entity, the sine qua non of intelligence of an
AI system, without having to patent an entire system. In this re-
gard, the AiP concept should make sense. Whether an AI system
will ever reach true intelligence is impossible to determine. If an Al
system is developed which does exhibit truly intelligent behavior, a
new rush for protection will begin, if it has not already begun, 91
which will probably be very similar to that experienced as a result
of software and semiconductor chip developments.92
It could be argued that a patent on the personality of an AI
system would unduly restrict development and research in other AI
systems. However, the purpose of patent protection is to provide
incentives to inventors. Although some restrictions might result,
because of such incentives, new developments are constantly being
created because of prior inventions. Humans must remember that
like the artificially intelligent system described above, it is the
human's ability to grow, learn and synergize that makes the human
intelligent. Providing patent protection as an incentive to develop
AI will also provide an incentive to go beyond AI into the future.
90. For example, 35 U.S.C. § 103 requires that the claimed invention be novel, useful
and non-obvious, and 35 U.S.C. § 112 requires that the claimed invention be phrased in defin-
itive and understandable terms, rather than couched in over-generalities.
91. See notes 49-56 and text accompanying.
92. Protection of Semiconductor Chip Products, 17 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (1977).
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